The Crown Film Unit 1946 to 1952 Role of John Grierson
When the COI and its Film Division was set up in 1946 it essentially took over the functions of the war time Ministry of Information albeit with a different relationship with other departments of government. At the same time a separate organisation the Crown Film Unit was placed under the control of the COI. The background to this rather odd relationship goes back to pre-war years and the existence of a very successful film unit owned and run by the Post Office: the GPO Film Unit.
In 1939 as the war started and the Ministry of Information was formed the important role of film in the coming conflict was quickly recognised as was the value of an existing film operation in the form of the GPO Film Unit.
So the GPO Film Unit was transferred to the new Film Division of the Ministry Of Information (MOI) in 1940. It became the Crown Film Unit - a part of the MOI. Based at Pinewood Studios it established a formidable reputation between 1940 and 1945.
The phrase "placing under the control " was essentially a Civil Service fudge. The reputation of the Crown Film Unit was huge and the thought of disbanding it was anathema to many. Yet the remit of the COI lm Division did not allow it to make its own films, all production was to be contracted out to commercial producers. Furthermore the instruction to departments was that they had to direct all their film making requirement to COI. Hence the fudge. COI Film Division had to contract work out to commercial producers while at the same time controlling the Crown Film Unit who were a fully functional production unit used to doing their own thing.
So what was the situation of the Crown Film Unit in 1946 and the problems it faced way in the next few years. Also what was the influence and role of John Grierson, who was recruited on a two year contract as COI Controller of Films in 1948 with oversight of both the Crown Film Unit and COI Film Division.
A two page unsigned document dated 9 July 1946 entitled “Crown Film Unit Under The COI” appears to be some form of directive ratifying the arrangement . It is a curiously written document suggesting that the author was either the COI Director General or the COI Home Controller both of whom had formally been in Post since 1 April 1946 when COI came into being.
Crown Film Unit was defined in the first paragraph as follows:
“The Unit will be a self-contained official film studio and production unit serving the requirements of the Film Division. Its management will be vested in the Producer-in-Charge who will be responsible to the COI DG through the Home Controller” (Stirling University Grierson Collection G5:5:4) The rather odd title of “Producer-in-Charge” was defined in the second paragraph as:
“The Producer-in-Charge will formulate and discharge a film production programme to meet the requirements of the Director Film Division and he will put to whatever use Director Film Division may indicate, studio space, sound facilities, etc, to the extent that these are not fully absorbed in the discharge of the unit’s own production programme.” (what this programme might be is not defined). (Stirling University Grierson Collection G5:5:4)
In further paragraphs the responsibilities of the Producer-in-Charge, (then Alexander Shaw) and his relationship with the Director of Film Division together with the COI Finance and Establishment Divisions were defined. Provision was made for the appointment of an Executive assistant to handle administrative matters. Finally a Committee under the Chairmanship of the COI Controller was to be set up to review each month all aspects of the progress of the Unit.
The committee was to consist of: Controller Films COI Producer-in-Charge Crown Film Unit Executive Assistant Crown Film Unit Director Films Division Director COI Finance Division Director COI Establishment Division
The Committee came to be known as the Crown Film Unit Conference. It was set up in July 1946 but did not meet until December 1946 following the drafting and agreement between Crown and COI of a “ Charter For the Crown Film Unit” which, in effect, was an expansion of the document of July 1946 to provide a more detailed description of the way the Unit should operate.
This Charter was agreed after much discussion between COI and Crown. It also involved discussion within Crown where there was a good deal of concern about its future especially its creative future and the extent of its freedom to run its own affairs.
The Charter was gradually implemented with some misgivings on the part of the COI as reflected by DG Robert Fraser who was concerned about effectiveness of the financial control in the light of experience thus far. He accepted that one Gordon Smith be appointed Executive Assistant to Shaw but was concerned about the accounting of day to day production expenditure which may “ arise(s) unseen and undetected…..in the day to day stress of production” .
He went on to say :
“ I am suggesting therefore that we proceed as follows:
We tell Crown, where there now seems some doubt of our intentions, that we propose to bring the financial provisions of the Charter progressively into operation within the next three months and earlier if possible.
That their application is at present waiting upon the submission of the fully descriptive statement of the arrangements they (Crown) propose to institute for, in particular, the control of commitments, and agreement upon the form in which the monthly accounts of expenditure and receipts are to be submitted “ (Minute of 11 September 1946 NA INF 5/1)
These paragraphs reflect the sense of “distance” which existed between COI and Crown some months after the latter was placed under the control of COI and which, despite various efforts, was to continue. Crown eventually produced a detailed document for financial control that was accepted by COI Finance Division.
Clearly while operating as a “self contained Unit”, Crown Film Unit was controlled by COI Management. It was a curious and anomalous situation: some might call it a fudge.
To repeat : under the terms of the COI remit laid down by the Attlee government COI Film Division was tasked with commissioning and overseeing the production of all films on behalf of all departments of government. It was not intended to actually make the films in the sense of owning its own studios having its own staff of technicians together with technical equipment such as cameras, sound recording equipment and the like.
However the Crown Film Unit was precisely geared to do this work. Given that policy decisions had been taken to undertake the production of information materials in the manner prescribed by the formation of COI, which was that film production should be entirely contracted out to commercial producers leaving only a supervisory and contracting role for COI, logic might have dictated that the Crown Film Unit was a clear candidate for immediate abolition, but not so.
Files at the National Archives have not shed light on the precise reason for placing Crown “under the control of COI”. Speculation suggests that its unique wartime reputation made its abolition politically difficult to carry out. An example, perhaps, of an old civil service adage that “it was easier to start something but more difficult to stop it”. Certainly as will be seen later there was strong opposition from within the documentary industry and the Labour Party to any talk of closing Crown. Moreover construction work had been approved in 1945/46 to build a new studio at Beaconsfield together with all the necessary facilities. This project was still going forward, though not too quickly: the facilities not being completed until 1947/1948.
What ever the exact reasons the files show that COI Management were unsure of how to handle the situation apart from being clear that COI Finance Division were ultimately responsible for the Crown Film Unit finances and the COI Establishment Division for staffing matters and the like.
Crown Film Unit at that moment was itself not in a good place. It was said that “it had lost its way” after a very successful run. It faced an uncertain future that led, in the latter part of 1945 for many staff to leave: the exodus was exacerbated by a shortage of experienced technicians in the documentary film industry.
While in 1946 work on a number of films such as The Cumberland Story was well underway, communication between Crown in rural Pinewood and the COI based in central London at Baker Street was intermittent, with no clear policy or direction.
The situation was summed up for Crown by the recently appointed Producer-in-Charge, Alexander Shaw (who had only been in Post a few weeks) in a note 11 April 1946 to B S Sendall, Controller at COI setting out a number of problems and suggesting ways forward, Shaw noted that there is:
“Something fundamentally wrong with the Unit as a whole. In fact there was a feeling of frustration and it was not due to minor matters which could be dealt with on the spot, but to deeper and more important causes. I compared its problems with other Units which I have known, (notably Realist and the I.F.I of India) all of which employed the same type of people as are at Crown and searched for a solution. Finally I went back to the basic principles which apply to any group of people working together to do creative work and found that the two units I had in mind, one of which it must be remembered was under government control had something which Crown has not. They had a feeling of freedom and a sense of responsibility. They also paradoxically, had a far stronger system of financial control than Crown has at present. The members of the Unit knew that it was up to them to make the system work and that there were no alibis to make, not THEY, ( managers and bureaucrats) to be blamed” (NA INF 5/1)
Among a number of conclusions he proposed that Crown be entirely separated from financial and administrative control by COI. The main (only) connection between Crown and COI would be a “full monthly report “ to the Controller. These suggestions did not appeal to COI Management.
The solution at that time (no mention of the 9 July 1946 document) was the creation of a “Charter for the Crown Film Unit” referred to earlier. In other words a fairly detailed agreement between the COI and Crown, that would define how Crown would interact with COI, its rights and responsibilities. The Charter took the better part of a year to work out and agree. It was not concluded until 1947. However as part of the arrangements, the first of a series of monthly meetings of a group called the Crown Film Unit Conference took place in December 1946.
Chaired by B C Sendall (COI Home Controller) the group consisted of four representatives of Crown : Alexander Shaw (Producer in charge), Gordon Smith (Chief Executive), John Taylor and W G Gilbert. For the COI R E Tritton (Director Films Division), Mrs Helen de Houilpied ( Film Division), W G Crossley (Finance Division) and S J Fletcher (Establishment Division)
The business of the group, consisted of an overview of the progress of Crown, fairly detailed discussion of the finances and any other matters which arose.
Thus eventually, through the Charter and the monthly meetings of the Conference, the COI came to exercise the control it had been given over the Crown Film Unit.
A very important issue was the question of the flow of work. What films and how many were to be made and who by? When setting up COI all departments who wanted to commission films were told that they had to commission them through COI. It followed that COI and Crown had to decide between themselves those films that were to be made by COI or by Crown. Thus Crown Film Unit would be dependent on Films Division for its work, for the films it was given to make by COI. These were clearly delicate decisions and appear to have been decided between Mrs Helen de Houilpied acting for COI Films Division and Alexander Shaw on behalf of Crown. While this somewhat unsatisfactory situation was coped with it would inevitably have been the cause of some degree of friction.
During the first two years of production, 1946 and 1947 research through National Archives and National Film Archive suggests that the total number of documentary films released by COI and Crown was 54, of which 19 were Crown and 35 were COI Films Division. However a booklet produced by COI around 1949 listed 48 films produced during the 12 month period April 1947 to March 1948. The discrepancy between the two figures is a consequence of the incomplete information found in the NA files referred to earlier. The incomplete situation being the fault of COI not the NA!
Nonetheless the figures represent a carry over of work by Crown of productions that were in the pipeline in April 1946 together with an amount of new work which departments had requested after April 1946 . Some of the new work was undertaken by Films Division and probably contracted out to commercial production companies with some passed to Crown.
An examination of the database of documentary films made between 1946 and 1952, when Crown was abolished, shows that after 1946 there appears to be a reasonably equal division of work.
However a note by Alexander Shaw dated 28 February 1947 on the eve of his departure from Crown says that :
“the relationship between Films Division and Crown Film Unit was… a major problem and the fact that it is unresolved prevents the Crown Film Unit from functioning properly. Let us take two basic factors :
One is that it costs £150,000 a year to run the unit. That may not be a very large sum of money in terms of Government expenditure, but it is a large sum in terms of running a documentary film unit. This expenditure can only be justified if sufficient work is produced…………………..Under the present system, this expenditure and this entire organisation is at the mercy of any individual in the Films Division. However much it may be argued that the Producer in Charge, Crown Film Unit is responsible to the Controller for the running of the Unit, and to the Director of Films Division for the films he produces, it is still completely true to say that any organised programme here can be, quite unwittingly ruined by the personal feelings or lack of experience of any person in Films Division. This seems to me to be one of the silliest situations that has ever been devised and although I would rather leave here with a beaming smile for everybody it seems necessary to put this fact down on paper………….. Eventually there seems little doubt that Films Division and Crown will have to be combined so that the Production Control Officers (Films Division) will be able to play their important part from within the unit instead of from outside”. ( NA INF 5/1)
He goes on to suggest that all proposals for films by departments should be looked at and discussed jointly by the Controller, the Director Films Division and the Crown Producer before any allocation took place.
In a note of 3 March 1947 Helen de Mouilpied suggests the problem is not as dire as painted by Shaw and implicitly rejects the point about the PCOs.
A note to COI Controller BS Sendall from the Director of Film Division R E Tritton of 4 March 1947 rejects the criticism that the Crown programme is left to “caprice and makeshift”. Tritton goes on to note that at that time Crown (a) has no studio (the move from Pinewood has not taken place) (b) Crown has very few facilities (for the same reason) (c) he has hardly any competent directors. This last point is odd since work appeared to be continuing. (NA INF 5/1)
Complicating the situation toward the end of 1947, was the first of the many inquiries into the value and purpose of the information services as a whole, that were to be inflicted on COI over the coming years. The inquiry (1948/49) Chaired by Sir Henry French (Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons) into the Home Services, eventually concluded with good and bad news . The good news was the confirmation of the justification of maintaining the government information services, the bad news was that it recommended considerable cuts in expenditure in media services, particularly including films.
When Alexander Shaw left 1947 he was replaced by John Taylor, who, like Shaw, struggled with a shortage of work and staff. A year later, in 1948, John Grierson was appointed COI Controller Films to supervise both the Films Division and Crown and charged with sorting out the issues bedevilling both entities. (see more on John Grierson below)
In late 1949 John Taylor left Crown and was replaced by Donald Taylor (both men were relatives of Grierson) who produced two Reports for Grierson reviewing the financial and work situation of Crown at that time. Substantially he concludes that Films Division and Crown should be merged (shades of Alexander Shaw), since an integrated operation could both produce all the films required by Government and produce them more efficiently and at less cost. He appears to have been unaware of the overall remit that COI should not have its own production facilities.
Grierson demurred at the idea of a wholesale merger. He pointed to changes in the past year (1947/48) that had:
“seen a re-orientation as between sponsors, COI and Crown…………..A year ago Crown was a pretty suspect organisation. It was regarded as pursuing its own purposes without much concern for its information duties or the public purse……………But since then a change of perspective, and to some extent of “sides” has taken place. Production irresponsibility has largely been weeded out and the new producers are a rather different lot.
He suggests the new situation needs time to work through in terms of the relativestrengths as between COI and Crown . He suggests the policy going forward should be to (a) streamline Crown (b) regard COI as a policy making source with the producers closer. Just how far these proposals were taken is not clear.
But it seems that the prospect of an integrated films operation structured to take in relations with Departments together with running a fully equipped production unit capable of actually making or contracting all the films required for the public service did not come to pass. In retrospect it can be argued that this was an unfortunate decision on the part of Grierson, though he might well have concluded that such proposals would have been very difficult to implement given the basic remit to Film Division about contracting work out.
While the two horse situation continued, the Crown Film Unit retained some but by no means all of the creative reputation achieved during the war years. At end of 1948 it had a substantial film production operation and staff, with some 224 people, based at the newly completed studio at Beaconsfield.
Meanwhile resolution of the anomaly of two largely separate film production operations was by no means clear and not helped by resistance from various parts of the documentary film industry to any thought of closing Crown. This was despite complaints about a slow production process and questions about the costs of production. Crown received some political support particularly from the Labour Party (then in Opposition). The possibility of closing Crown Film Unit was regarded, in some quarters as losing “ a national treasure”.
The Crown Film Unit continued to take on commissions from COI and elsewhere until 1952. By then the arguments for and against closure had raged within the documentary industry for several years and came to a head with the arrival of a Conservative government in 1952. The new government was determined to cut public spending in the face of economic problems. Crown presented a useful candidate for a “saving” which would not attract any great public attention, as indeed did the actual closure of COI itself, in 2012.
The government arguments were encapsulated during a debate in the House of Commons on the 10 March 1952 when the final decision for closure of Crown was made.
The argument for keeping the Crown Film Unit was led for the Labour Party by Anthony Greenwood MP. He noted that during earlier debates it was contended that the unit had always “worked with minimum cost and a maximum of intelligence”. He went on to list a number of films made during and after WW2 and said
“ I do not think one can assess the value of films of that kind, although it has been estimated that one film, “Family Affair” was instrumental, by finding foster parents for children, in saving public funds something like £50,000 a year” ( Hansard 1952 vol 497 cc1223-32)
He went on to quote the Daily Telegraph about Crown films. He said on 3 March
“ films like these, by reminding us of things that it is pleasanter to forget, make for a better world: they save lives: they remind foreigners that the nobler British traditions, medical and humanitarian, live still. Shown over most of the world with commentaries in 20 languages, they do invaluable service politically by rebutting hostile propaganda about neglect of our poor at home and exploitation of natives in the Colonies” It was not for nothing that the Crown Film Unit has been awarded what are called Oscars on two occasions. The Crown Film Unit has become a pattern for similar film units in the Dominions and I saw a letter from America the other day which said that the British might as well sell the pictures from the National Gallery as do away with the Crown Film Unit because of the important influence it has had in the United States.” ( Hansard 1952 vol 497 cc1223-32)
Mr Greenwood continued with similar argument to implore the government to change its mind and was followed by Christopher Hollis MP who complained about a lack of financial evidence to support the case for closure.
Replying for the government the Financial Secretary to the Treasury: John Boyd-Carpenter accepted with some reservation the technical and artistic merits of the Crown Film Unit, but went on the argue the case for closure on the grounds of public economy in a time of financial crisis.
He said:
“ The basis of the matter is that the Government have decided, quite apart from the Crown Film Unit, to reduce substantially Government expenditure on films as a whole. This does not spring from any antipathy to that agreeable method of disseminating information. It is based on the fact that the production and distribution of films is a highly expensive way of carrying on information work and that this is a method of information activity which has to be substantially restricted.
Once we adopt that attitude, the case for maintaining a separate and special unit for the production of Government films becomes very much weaker. If we decide to carry on production on the comparatively large scale undertaken in 1946/47 there is a much stronger case for having a specialised unit to produce films for the Government. If we decide, as a matter of policy and national economy, to reduce substantially – though not completely to eliminate – the production of films, the case for the overheads, organisation costs, and accommodation of a separate film unit, becomes, pro tanto, very much weaker.” (Hansard 1952 Vol 97 cc 1223-320)
Mr Boyd-Carpenter continued with further statistics to demonstrate that the Crown Film Unit was an expensive organisation both in terms of production and distribution where receipts had fallen from £25,000 in 1946/7 to £3,000 in 1952.
The debate concluded with the decision to proceed with the abolition of the Crown Film Unit.
In due time the studios at Beaconsfield were largely taken over by an independent feature film production company though some cutting rooms and a recording studio taken over by Ken Cameron who had been the senior recording engineer for Crown. He founded the Anvil Film Unit who, in later years, were to make many films for COI. Part of the studio also continued to house the archive of Crown Film Unit until the late 1960s when COI took the archive into some new purpose built vaults at Hayes that also stored the COI archive.
Beyond the decision to close Crown was the announcement that the Government was to drastically reduce its expenditure on the production of films overall thus foreshadowing a number of lean years to come for COI Film Division
John Grierson
In 1948 when the COI was still grappling with the management and respective responsibilities of the twin horses of the Film Division and the Crown Film Unit. The COI Director General decided to recruit a figure who had substantial experience in managing film operations in the public service in an attempt to resolve the issues bedevilling the two entities..
The person chosen was John Grierson a highly regarded figure in the film industry, thought of as being the “ father of the documentary film”. At the time he was working for UNESCO as Director of Mass communications and Public Information. Before UNESCO he had been responsible for drafting the National Film Act of Canada and the founding of the Canadian National Film Board for which he was General Manager during the wartime years.
A new COI Senior Post was created for him to take on the role of “Controller Films” bestriding both COI and the Crown Film Unit. He took up this post in April 1948 on a contract for two years.
Memory in the early 1960s is of the tales of John Grierson was of rows and disagreements circulating in Films Division. However two letters in Grierson’s personal COI file in the National Archives suggest something different. The first letter dated 17 February 1948 to Sir Robert Fraser Director General of the COI, followed Grierson’s acceptance of his contract. In it Grierson records discussions between himself and Fraser about the state of the COI films operation that included the Crown Film Unit.
He notes: “ You have yourself in our discussions been most clear about the present state of COI films operation, about your disappointment with it from whatever cause and your sense of the need for a new and bold approach to its problems; and you have been flattering enough to think I may bring a fresh force to bear which will secure a more effective and orderly service from the point of view of Government responsibility. I therefore look forward to exercise some of the powers necessary to carry out a not un-complex and difficult task. I have not thought it in your mind that this simply involves putting me on top of an existing structure in the hope that, by personal miracle, that existing structure will suddenly acquire a new life and authority. I have no such powers of personal miracle and what I shall really need to have is the full and ready power to alter that structure where necessary. This may, and most likely will involve changes in the functions of subordinate officers and different functional relations between them. It will not however be an overnight process and no one need by unduly worried about the impact of a new broom. I am not such.” (NA INF 21/2)
It is his experience at the Canadian National Film Board which he draws on. All the issues in Grierson’s letter were eventually accepted by Fraser. Exactly how it worked out over the next two years is not precisely recorded. In a letter to Fraser of 26 September 1950, when looking ahead to the end of his contract, he speaks of the:
“ further collaboration of the film industry with the public service (COI)………Here again I shall hope to use my own independence usefully”.
And more: “ But let there be no suggestion of any sort that in this matter there is an issue with yourself or with the COI. On the personal side I have never been in a department so domestically well run or where relations were so pleasant and peaceful. For that I must remain uncommonly grateful to you. As for the COI, it has represented the difficult and unthankful work of re-casting the Information Service in terms of the practical possibilities of the immediate post-war period; and with a job of organisation and tidying up which does you honour in the result”.(NA INF21/2)
It would seem that they parted on good terms. Grierson went off to start a new documentary film group.
Clearly there are some gaps and questions to be raised in the light of the foregoing account. John Grierson’s papers are in the keeping of Stirling University. Those relating to his time at COI do not provide any very coherent account but there are some useful clues.
The first is a 15 page paper by Grierson dated January 5 1946 entitled “Notes on the British Government’s Film Activities “ (Sterling University Grierson papers G5:5:2). The audience for this paper is not clear. It is not addressed to anyone in particular, but given Grierson’s eminence both in the documentary film industry and connections he would have in political circles, it is highly likely that is was intended for and probably received circulation to those interested in the future prospects of the documentary film and its place in government information. It would not be coincidental that it was written in January 1946 only three months before COI comes into being, at a time when the nature and structure of COI Films Division would have known in some degree by people in the documentary film industry especially people such as Grierson.
Grierson’s paper ranges widely. It not only took in Crown Film Unit, it said something about COI, the British Council and the British Film Institute. It looked at the role of the liaison officer as distinct from the creative staff. It paid attention to the questions of distribution both in the UK and overseas. In an odd way it might have been said that it almost amounted to a job application given that 24 months later he accepted the position of Controller Films at COI.
At the outset Grierson makes clear that his purpose is to “review the situation and some of the problems which now beset the government film operation”. He pointed to the UK experience both pre-war and during wartime of making good use of the film medium and was concerned that this experience would not be lost.
He raised a concern about “the present malaise of the (Crown ) unit…….it does not feel it is part and parcel of the public purpose”. It was certainly true that a number of leading figures in Crown had left during a period of uncertainty as to its future. Thus the unit, of itself, was not thinking about “the urgent questions of housing, health, nutrition, labour relations” , social themes such as might have made purposeful documentary films that it might have done in times past by the leading figures in the documentary film and were part of Crown Film Unit. It was still a skill centre but it was operating without the “purposive minds” of past creative producers.
He proposed the concept of a “Controller” close to the DG who could “throw his weight about” in the battles between the “civil service” and the creative folk (a tension that was to continue for years to come!). Above all he felt the need for a Controller to provide a creative leadership for the film operation much as he did in Canada.
He had some interesting thoughts about the role(s) of what he termed “liaison staff” who would provide the link between COI/Crown and the client departments. He saw their role as being essential to the smooth running of the production process ensuring that the films produced met the needs of the departments. He went further and suggested that the liaison officer should develop a clear understanding of the needs of the departments in some depth.
Beyond the production process he had much to say about the importance of distribution and the relationship between production and distribution and the need for a marketing operation. He paid particular tribute to the Central Film Library and the role of mobile projection units suggesting that the drivers might also become teachers in the sense of introducing films and speaking about them as well as projecting them.
At the conclusion of the paper Grierson also made a number of suggestions for a wider role for COI in relation to the documentary industry none of which came to pass.
The paper effectively offered Grierson’s ideas about how a public service film making operation should function. It must surely have come to the attention of Robert Fraser when he was casting about in 1947 for a solution to the continuing problems thrown up in the relationship of COI and Crown Film Unit.
When Grierson joined COI in April 1948 it followed two years of the difficult relations between COI and Crown referred to earlier. In the correspondence with Robert Fraser Grierson had noted that it would take time to establish relations and make the changes he might feel necessary. He did not regard himself as a “miracle worker”.
So the question arises, what did he do, what did he achieve during his two year contract ending April 1950 especially about the continuing problem of Crown. The clues are a little sparse.
As noted earlier the problems with Crown were set out in a note dated 28 February 1947 by Alexander Shaw (NA INF5/1) Producer-in-Charge at Crown on the eve of his departure and some 12 months before Grierson arrived. Shaw had been with Crown since it was put under the control of COI. His valedictory note pointed first to positive achievements:
“ With the excellent help of Establishments and Finance we think we have now put the unit onto a good working basis within the framework of the civil service………if there are any major administrative or financial difficulties they work themselves out between the Controller and the Crown Producer.”
So far so good. But then pointing to the annual cost £150,000 of running Crown he strongly complains about the make up of his work programme (bearing mind that all the work Crown undertook came from COI Films Division) he notes: “ the programme of the Crown Film Unit should not be left to caprice and makeshift “
He went on to complain about the initial phases of communication with client departments. It appears that once a subject was allocated to Crown a Films Division Production Control Officer (PCO) held initial meetings with the client to settle a “brief” before Crown were brought on board. This, Shaw says should change. He suggested that the Film Division PCO’s be transferred to Crown to better integrate them with the production teams at Crown. It comes as no surprise that COI refuted the complaints about the work programme and rejected any idea of moving the PCOs.
These complaints suggest that working relationships between Crown and COI were not that good despite the detailed Charter and the monthly meetings. Hence very probably Fraser’s action to recruit Grierson in the hope that he could out these and other issues might be resolved.
There is no evidence as to how Grierson actually handled matters on arrival at COI. The next piece of evidence is contained in notes by Donald Taylor (referred to earlier) who had taken on the role of Producer-in-Charge in early 1949. He wrote two Minutes dated 15 August 1949 and 11 October 1949 (Stirling University Archives G5.5.3) to Grierson copied to Niven McNicoll then Director of Film Division and S J Fletcher Director COI Establishment Division.
In the first Minute he analyses the issues for the future operation of the Beaconsfield Studios. He poses two questions (a) is the maintenance and operation of the studio justified (b) whether Crown Film Unit production is efficiently set up. He notes also that these questions require reference to the Film Division operation since the two are connected.
He goes on to list the number of films produced by Crown from 1946 to July 1949 and concludes that the Beaconsfield operation is conceived on too generous a scale for the economical operation of government film making at that time. He sets out various options for change and a reduction of staff and facilities. He estimates the amount of production (number of films per annum) required to sustain the operation together with some staff reductions.
He then turns to the relationship between Crown and COI suggesting that the flow of work is “hampered” by the Films Division working methods repeating some of the criticisms made by Alexander Shaw in 1947 nearly two years earlier. In particular the nature of the relationship with Film Division through the PCOs. The overall situation suggests that nothing much has changed in this relationship.
In a later Minute October 1947 addressed just to Grierson and marked “Confidential” Taylor starts by saying:
” It is rapidly becoming apparent as I have expressed elsewhere, that the PCO system as at present constituted is unsatisfactory………………that with 3 possibly 4 Associate Producers at Crown the need for the PCO system ceases to be of value at least in respect of the Crown Film Unit. It is evident that both Stuart Legg and Helen de Mouilped” are the best equipped people in our field to deal with sponsoring departments.”
After further analysis he goes on to say:
“ it is well within the power of the Crown Film Unit to produce the entire Government film programme…..If the Government film programme is undertaken atBeaconsfield the need for Film Division ceases to exist”. He goes on to argue that if the work is concentrated at Beaconsfield it could result in considerable savings in manpower and administration and result in a much more efficient operation.
Finally we hear the voice of Grierson in a frustrating two pages of an undated nine page Minute that appears to be responding to Taylor’s notes. Grierson says that a move from Beaconsfield would be “unwise” but suggests that there could be streamlining in the “ armies of unioneers”.
He notes the need for a re-alignment in the relations between Crown and COI. On a positive note he points to a turn round in the past year from;
“Crown as a pretty suspect organisation” to one where “Production irresponsibility has largely been weeded out and new Producers at Crown are a rather different lot. They have a will to serve the Raj, some understanding of the climate of sponsorship and how to deal with it, and do not necessarily regard senior civil servants as their mortal foes…….It is partly this closer alliance of the producers with the leading sources of information and its execution that has upset the PCO apple cart and accentuated its weaknesses..”
That is to say the previous policy of keeping Crown at some arms length from Departments has changed in some degree and that Grierson has engineered the recruitment of new blood at Producer level.
Grierson goes on to criticise some constraints relating to financial controls both in Crown and COI that he sees as being unnecessary. He is not persuaded that the present situation is a:
” this year urgency but my sense of the way things might usefully stack up is to:
Streamline Crown.
Regard COI as
a policy making source, with the producers (Crown) closer
A distributive-service source, as now
A Finance-administrative source -as now”
Here the two pages in the Grierson Archives at Stirling University run out so we don’t know what else he recommended. But his note did envisage making better use of Crown. To go the distance proposed by Donald Taylor, which would have been to reduce the role of COI Film Division vis-a-vis Crown to that of policy making, while enhancing that of Crown to be the overall producer of government films was probably felt by Grierson to be a distance too far. The benefit of hindsight suggests that the proposed changes would have been a good move in terms of providing an efficient and economical means of producing films for the public service. It would have headed off the eventual wholesale abolition of Crown. It would of course have run counter to the original concept of COI as a commissioner not a producer of government films.
The other interesting point was the indication that Crown had been able to make changes in its people and its relations with COI. How far was Grierson responsible for changing the people? We don’t know, we do know from his correspondence with Fraser that he envisaged doing so.
What other evidence is there of Grierson’s time at COI? There is a letter to Grierson’s biographer, Forsyth Hardy dated 14 February 1978 from an unknown senior member of Crown. He is commenting on Hardy’s forthcoming book “John Grierson: A Documentary Biography”.
He says of Grierson and his time at COI and Crown:
“ I don’t think he could cope with the constitutional position, - we had no minister -and therefore in theory no policy of our own. We could only start a film at the request of another Government department. Of course we went to all our old friends – the best among the P.R.Os and put ideas to them and stimulated the right demands so far as we could…………… It was obviously often frustrating when imaginative ideas were put forward to find that, say, three different departments had to be made to collaborate, because the “idea” covered ground which wasn’t confined to one. I think this “confused” and frustrated Grierson…………Also he was no administrator – at least not on a big scale………I am trying to show that the COI was a hybrid and couldn’t provide a base for Grierson’s wide-ranging ideas”. He went to say “ None of this takes away from Grierson’s role as critic, promoter of ideas and discussion”.
Elsewhere it is suggested that while Grierson understood the actuality of the COI and Crown situation and attempted to work to improve the situation by, for instance, bringing in new producers to Crown, he was nonetheless frustrated by the situation and possibly believed he couldn’t change it. Some evidence of this was contained in a speech he made in March 1950 to the Institute of Public Relations. He was quoted as saying that:
“ it was a great set back that the Government found no other terms of reference of the terms of reference of the former Ministry of Information than those of the Central Office of Information. The effect had been to eliminate the positive benefits of Ministerial leadership and subject the whole process to the mercies of Departmental policies………..the national interest was forgotten in the day to day processes of departmental business. It was not the fault of COI that the national interest was forgotten. The COI was there to take orders and within its terms of reference was a competent and pleasant organisation”
A comparison of these remarks with Griersons review of early January 1946, demonstrates the gulf between his aspirations for the use of film in the public interest for social and economic progress and the actuality ofdealing with day to day issues on a jobbing basis.
He appeared to have felt that was not much more he could achieve inside COI. Indeed in his parting letter to Robert Fraser (NA INF21/2) of 26 September 1950 he looks:
“forward to being more useful to everyone on the side lines. As you know I think you should have other and stronger terms of reference, not weaker; and that COI has had a tough break in the relative failure of outside commentary to catch what it is all about.”
Shortly after Grierson left COI an economic axe wielded by a new Conservative government put paid to Crown Film Unit and much of the budget of COI Films Division in 1952. While those films that were in the pipeline continued to completion the number of new films commissioned through COI fell dramatically, only really recovering around 1956.